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INTERNATIONAL LAW ON USE OF ENEMY
UNIFORMS AS A STRATAGEM AND THE

ACQUITTAL IN THE SKORZENY CASE
MlAxnaLmiA

KoEssLER*

I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the trial, by an American military commission entitled
"Military Government Court,"' of Otto Skorzeny and his codefendants, 2
which trial took place in Dachau between August 18 and September 8,
1947, and ended with an acquittal of all the defendants, the international
law on legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use of enemy uniforms as a
stratagem was not settled in so far as use outside open combat was concerned, as will be later on discussed at some length. One writer has
expressed the view that the outcome of that trial supports the view
"that such deception is permissible if not done in battle."8 However,
this is not necessarily so. In the trials conducted by the War Crimes
Group of the U.S. Army of occupation in Germany, including the
Skorzeny case, the judgments, at variance with the Nuremberg judgments, consisted of bare verdicts of guilty or not guilty, in case of conviction accompanied by announcement of the sentence, but did not contain
findings of fact nor anything in the nature of legal reasoning. In certain
simple cases the basis of the verdict appears, as a matter of implication,
from the verdict itself. But this is otherwise where, as in the subject case,
so many facets of fact and law are involved that the acquittal may be
ex post facto rationalized on any of several grounds or on two or more
of them. It is therefore pointed out in a publication of the United Nations
War Crimes Commission that "no safe conclusion can be drawn from the

*Jur. D., Austrian University of Czernowitz, 1912; M.A., Columbia University,
1941, LL.B., 1945. Employed by U. S. Dep't of the Army as attorney for war crimes
trial and military government activities, 1946-49. Engaged for many years in the

practice of law in Vienna, Austria. Author of numerous articles in American and
European political science and legal periodicals. Member of the California and New
York Bars.
1. See Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39 GEO. L.J. 18, 42-45
(1950).
2.

The voluminous trial record was perused by the writer through courtesy

extended by the War Crimes Division, U.S. Department of the Army.
3. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency," 23 BRar. J. INT' L. 322, 341
(1946).
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acquittal of all accused" in the Skorzeny case as to the scope of legitimate
use of enemy uniforms as a stratagem. 4 While the case has thus little,
if any value, as a judicial declaration settling a point of international law
with regard to which the experts do not agree, it may have been the basis
of the definite position taken by the United States Department of the
Army in an official publication subsequent to the Skorzeny trial that the
use of enemy uniforms as a ruse is forbidden "during combat, but their
use at other times is not forbidden." 5 At any rate, however its outcome
may be explained, and whatever conclusions may thus be drawn therefrom as to any legal ruling implied therein, the case, which has so far
been covered only in a very succinct way,6 is historically and juridically
important enough to deserve such a full discussion of facts and law
involved as is attempted herewith.

1[.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To place the case against its historical background, we must briefly
refer to the Battle of the Bulge and to what had caused Hitler to entrust
an important mission in that campaign to Otto Skorzeny.
A. The Battle of the Bulge
Like the Malmedy Massacre case, tried in Dachau between May 16
and July 16, 1946, which has been probed by the United States Senate
because of highly questionable methods applied in the pre-trial investigation,7 the Skorzeny case goes back to that last offensive flareup
of Hitler's "Wehrmacht" which is in this country usually referred to
as the "Battle of the Bulge," in Germany as the "Eifel Offensive," and
is also known as the "Ardennes" and as the "Von Rundstedt" offensive. 9
Significantly covered by a distinquished author in a chapter entitled
"Hitler's Last Bid,"'10 that offensive was planned to break up the Allied

4.

Trial

of

Otto Skorzeny, 9 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

90,

93

(1949).

U.S. AMY FiELD MANUAL, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
6. Trial of Otto Skorzeny, supra note 4, at 90-94.
5.

23 (1956).

7. MALI EDY MASSACRE INVEsTIGATION, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). For previous
denial of habeas corpus, see Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 324 (1948).
8. MERRIAm, DARK DECEMBER: THE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

(1947).
9. The first three names related to the geographical vicinity in which this
part of the war was fought and the fourth one referred to Field Marshall Von
Rundstedt, then Supreme Commander, German Western Front.
10. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE 342-65 (1948).
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front by driving a wedge into it in an area close to the German-Belgian
border. This strategic masterplan was Hitler's own invention. And convinced of his superior military genius he stuck to it despite objections
raised by some of his top military advisers. Among the major German
units to which he entrusted the carrying out of his plan, were elements
of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, commanded by General of the SS Josef
("Sepp") Dietrich. A formation within the Sixth Army was the "Combat
Group Peiper," which was supposed to spearhead the break-through
with lightning speed and members of which were involved in the
Malmedy Massacre. Skorzeny's Brigade, of which we shall have more to
say later, was for certain purposes attached to the Sixth Army and in
part operating in conjunction with Peiper's Combat Group. The attack
began on December 16, 1944, took the Allied intelligence and strategic
experts by surprise, proceeded in the beginning with rapidity and success,
but was soon halted and repelled. It collapsed, however, only after
having caused numerous casualties on both sides." There were some
critical moments for our troups in the course of this bloody campaign.
But final German defeat was acknowledged by Hitler on January 9, 1945,
in authorizing Von Rundstedt, at his request, to order a general withdrawal of the German. forces. The failure of the offensive, which according to the "Fuehrer's" day dream was bound to turn the tides of the war
in Europe, was an important part of the "death of Hitler's Germany," to
borrow a phrase coined by a French writer colorfully covering the
vicissitudes of that campaign 1 2 the planning of which was the military
swansong of the German dictator.
B. Skorzeny's Pre-Battle-of-the-Bulge Career
Otto Skorzeny, whose remarkable exploits under the Hitler regime
are, in the writer's belief, too enthusiastically described in a book
obviously inspired by himself,'" is one of those devoted adepts of nazism
who were not adversely affected in a substantial way by the consequences
of the collapse of the Hitler regime in Germany. After his release, following his acquittal in the war crimes trial, he left the "fatherland" and,
according to newspaper reports, has engaged abroad in what may be
called neo-nazi propaganda. Unquestionably, however, his most adven-

11. Id. at 364, 365.
12.
13.

BLoND, THE DEATH OF HiTLa's GERMANY (1954).
FOLEY, COMUANDO EXTRAORDINARY (1st Am. ed. 1955).
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turous and to a measurable extent successful undertakings during the
Hitler era characterize him as a man possessing a high degree of personal
courage, resourcefulness and dexterity. Despite his Hungarian name a
native Austrian, he became, after the German annexation of that country,
euphemized by Hitler as "Anschluss," a member of that part of the
German army which originally was composed only of members of the
Party's SS who volunteered for regular military service and was therefore called "Waffen SS." By his conduct during the war, in combat as
well as on other military occasions, he earned praise of his superiors and
recognition of his extraordinary capacities, expressed by giving him
special assignments and by calling the attention of Hitler in person to the
potentialities inherent in him. This bore fruit when Skorzeny, then a
captain in the Waffen SS, was in July 1943 called before Hitler and by
the latter entrusted with the task of organizing a parachute action to
rescue Mussolini, then believed by the Germans to be detained on the
island of Elba. Before engaging in such action, Skorzeny, on his own
initiative, procured intelligence to the effect that Mussolini was actually
detained in a hotel on the Grande Sasso, a mountain group forming
part of the Appenines. His report thereon, given at a second conference
with Hitler in person, was approved as the basis for the kidnap-liberation of Mussolini, which was thereupon planned by Skorzeny and with
his personal participation successfully carried out. This achievement,
broadcast by newspaper bannerlines all over the world and celebrated
in Germany as a great triumph, was rewarded by Skorzeny's promotion
to Lt. Colonel. He had before been charged with the organization of a
unit to be called "Jagdstaffeln" and to be formed after the pattern of
the British Commandos and the American Rangers. While he was
engaged in carrying out this assignment, he was, in the course of the
planning of the Ardennes offensive, again called before Hitler to receive
the mission described later.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

To trace the international law background of the charges raised
against the defendants in the Skorzeny case, 14 we must first deal with
14. There were originally ten defendants. But after the prosecution had rested
its case and prior to the introduction of defense evidence two were acquitted, one

on a nolle prosequi motion of the prosecution, the other in partial grant of a defense
motion to acquit all the accused on the ground that the prosecution had not presented even a prima facie case. There remained thus eight defendants for final judgment, Skorzeny himself and the following who had had officers' ranks in his Brigade:
Wilhelm Kocherscheid, the one who, as will be seen later, was singled out by the
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the indictment or "charge sheet" as it was called in those trials'0 and
thereupon cover certain rules established by multipartite international
treaties.
A. The Charges
The accusation consisted originally of four counts, but one of them,
charge II whereby the defendants were charged with unlawful treatment
of prisoners of war and which rested on an initial suspicion that they
had participated in the atrocities tried in the Malmedy Massacre case,
was withdrawn by the prosecution when it rested its case since there was
a complete lack of evidence in this respect. The substance of the other
three accusations was that "acting in pursuance of a common design""'
they had within a specified period of time and in a generally indicated
geographical region encouraged, aided, abetted and participated in the
following:
[charge I] improper use of the military insignia, badges, emblems, markings, and uniforms of the Armed Forces of the
United States of America by entering into combat disguised
therewith and treacherously firing upon and killing members of
the Armed Forces of the United States of America
[charge III] removing, appropriating, and using uniforms, identification documents, insignia of rank, decorations, and other
effects and objects of personal use in the possession of members
of the Armed Forces of the United States, who were then and
there surrendered and unarmed prisoners of war in the custody
of the then German Reich
[charge IV] obstructing and preventing the delivery of Red
Cross and other parcels, containing food and clothing, consigned
to members of the Armed Forces of the United States of America,
who were then and there surrendered and unarmed prisoners
in the custody of the then German Reich
All this was contained in that part of the charge sheet which was
entitled "Particulars" and which was in the following respect alike

evidence as having committed a homicidal act; Philipp von Behr; Ralph Bellstedt;
Guenther Fitze; Hans Hass; Dennis Muentz; and Walter Scherf.
15. It was called by this name because drawn in the form designated "charge
sheet" that was then in use in court martial cases.
16. For legal difference between "common design" and conspiracy charges, see
15 LAw REPORTS

OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

94-98 (1949).
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of defendants, tried under the auspices of the War Crimes Group of the
U.S. Army of occupation in Germany. There was no particularization
of the specific acts charged to have been committed by the several
defendants individually, a feature which is far from the ideal form of
"Particulars," it would seem. And similarly amounting to a lump accusation was the first part of the charge sheet in which the defendants were
without reference to any specific principle or rule of international law
accused of "violation of the laws and usages of war."
From the quoted parts of the accusation it appears that in count I
the defendants were charged with use of American uniforms and other
American military paraphernalia "by entering into combat disguished
therewith" as well as "treacherously'" in combat action; that count Inl
charged them with procurement of such uniforms and other paraphernalia
from the personal possession of American prisoners of war; and that
count IV referred to the fact, proved in the course of the trial, that to
procure things to be used for camouflage. purposes Red Cross parcels
deftined for American prisoners of war were requisitioned in the course
of outfitting members of Skorzeny's Brigade.
B. PertinentHague Regulations
The Hague Regulations of 1907,17 which are universally recognized
as the primary source of the international law governing land warfare,
contain the following provisions closely or remotely bearing on the
subject of count I of the described charges. Article 23(f) specifically
prohibits "improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive
badges of the Geneva Convention." This is preceded by the prohibition,
in article 23(b), of killing or wounding "treacherously" individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army. Article 1, in prescribing the
conditions which "militia and volunteer corps" must fulfil to have the
benefit of the "laws, rights, and duties of war," includes in subdivision 2
the requirement of "a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance." Article 24 sets forth that "ruses of war" and the employment
of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and

17. Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land, 36 STAT. 2295,
annexed to Hague Convention No. IV, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 STAT. 227, T.S. No. 539, 2
MALLoy, TnAxms 2269 (1910).
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the country are considered permissible. Article 29 provides in part that
soldiers "not wearing -a disguise" who have penetrated into the zone of
operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information,
are not considered spies. And according to article 31, a spy who, after
rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the
enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for
his previous acts of espionage.
Of course, of the foregoing rules, that contained in article 23(f) is
the cardinal one, in so far as count I of the accusation in the Skorzeny
case is concerned. It does not absolutely outlaw the use of enemy uniforms. It merely prohibits their "improper use," without, however, establishing a standard for the determination of when the use is improper.
This question has obviously been left open by the Hague Convention.1 8
One writer attempts to prove from the history of article 23(f) that it
was intended thereby to prohibit any use the purpose of which is to
deceive the enemy.19 But irrespective of the soundness or unsoundness
of the historical basis of his argument, it cannot be conclusive in view of
the fact that nothing to this effect is expressed or implied by the language
of that article.
On two points there appears to be universal, or at least general agreement: no violation of international law is involved in the wearing of
enemy uniforms not for camouflage purposes, but to cope with a necessity
created by lack of other clothing; 20 and the use of the enemy's uniform
for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by thus concealing one's hostile
status is at least unlawful where this is done in open combat. 21 Beyond
that, however, there is a marked division of opinion among writers on
international law. 22 Some believe that the wearing of enemy uniforms

18. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 552 (6th ed. 1915); 2 WHEATON,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (7th ed. Keith 1944); SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 106 (1911).

19. Jobst II, Is the Wearing of the Enemy's Uniform a Violation of the Laws
of War?, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 438-39 (1941).
20. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR 45 (1908); LAwRENcE, op. cit. supra note 18, at
533; SPAIGHT, op. cit. supra note 18, at 106; 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1812 n.9 (2d

rev. ed. 1945); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 n.7 (7th ed.
Jobst I1, supra note 19, at 437 n.6.

Lauterpacht

1952);

21. BLuNTSCHLi, DAS MODERNE VOELKERRECET 318, 319 (3d ed. 1878); 3 CALVO, LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL' 152, 154 (1880); 2 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2d ed.
1913); LAWRENCE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 552; U.S. Anua FIELD MANUAL, THE LAW
o LAND WARFARE 23 (1956).
22. 2 OPPENHEIMt, op. cit. supra note 20, at 429; 9 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRnMNALS 92 (1949); HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLiC LAW AND
ORGANIZATION 597 nA1 (rev. ed. 1939).
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for camouflage purposes is prohibited under all circumstances, 23 whereas
others exclude from the scope of the prohibition the wearing on other
occasions than in open combat, for instance when approaching enemy
lines prior to the battle. 2 4 In support of the first mentioned opinion it is
pointed out that an element of fraud is involved in any use for camouflage
purposes, and that the settled distinction between ruses of war that are
allowed 2 5 and acts of treachery or perfidy that are unlawful 2 6 must be
kept in mind in determining when the use of enemy uniforms is improper.
Emphasis is placed on the lack of a logically tenable reason for treating
deceptive use of enemy uniforms outside open combat differently from
use in open combat. 27 Article 1 of the Hague Regulations, requiring that
militia and volunteer corps must have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, has also been invoked as supporting the view
28
that that distinction is unsound.
On neither side of that literary controversy has particular considera-

23. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS *1223 (2d ed. 1896 reprinted in
1920), and writers cited by OPPENHELim, op. cit. supra note 20, and in 9 LAw REPORTS
OF TRIALS OF WAR CIINAmS 92 (1949).
24. BORDELL, THE LAW OF WAR 283 (1908) ("allowed for purposes of approach");
2 WESTLAKE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 80 ("allowed up to the last moment before
fighting, when the true colours must be resumed").
25. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 551 (6th ed. 1915) ("That they
may be used at all is due to the fact that war is a conflict of wits as much as a
conflict of arms"); STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (1931) ("To prohibit them would
be to arrest progress, and to favor mere brawn at the expense of brains").
26. HOLLAND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 45 (article 24 of Hague Regulations does
not authorize acts of treachery); 2 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (7th ed. Keith
1944) (article 24 is subject to prohibition of treachery as well as to that contained in
article 23(f)); SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 106 (1911) (ruses of war are recognized,
provided they do not involve treachery); Jobst H, Is the Wearing of the Enemy's
Uniform a Violation of the Laws of War?, 35 AvM. INT'L L. 435, 440 (1941) (while ruses
of war are legitimate, devices for deceiving the enemy which involve perfidy or
treachery are unlawful); U.S. A~mn FIELD MANUAL, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 22
(1956) ("ruses of war are legitimate so long as they do not involve treachery or
perfidy on the part of the belligerent resorting to them"); 2 OPPENHEIM, Op. cit. supra
note 20, at 430 ("Stratagems must be carefully distinguished from perfidy, since
the former are allowed whereas the latter is prohibited").
27. 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1811, 1812' (2d rev. ed. 1945); Jobst II, Is the
Wearing of the Enemy's Uniform a Violation of the Laws of War?, 35 Am. J. INT'L L.
435, 440, 441 (1941); LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES 01 INTERNATIONAL LAW 552 (6th ed. 1915)
(distinction between use in open combat and otherwise is denounced "with good
reason"); HALL, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 649 (8th ed. 1924) (that distinction
is a "curious and arbitrary rule"); SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 104, 105 (1911)
("The quiddity of the rule is difficult to follow. When the disguise has done what
it was intended to do, there is little virtue in discarding it. If it is improper to wear
the enemy's uniform in pitched battle, it must surely be equally improper to deceive
him by wearing it up to the first shot or clash of arms").
28. 3 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 1812; LAWRENCE, Op. cit. supra note 27, at
552, 553; Jobst II, supra note 27, at 439, 440.
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tion been given to the specific situation, appearing in the Skorzeny case,
in which enemy uniforms are used as a stratagem to penetrate enemy
lines for the purpose of action behind those lines. Nor, prior to the
Skorzeny trial, has the question ever been considered whether the qualified immunity extended by article 31 of the Hague Regulations to a spy
not caught in flagranti carries with it immunity from prosecution for use
of enemy uniforms in espionage activities, where the perpetrators were
not caught until after having rejoined the armed forces to which they
29
belonged.
C. Pertinent Geneva Rules
Counts I and IV of the charges in the Skorzeny case were based
on the following rules of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of
1929:30
Article 6. All effects and objects of personal use-except arms,
horses, military equipment and military papers-shall remain in
the possession of prisoners of war, as well as metal helmets and
gas masks. . . . Identification documents, insignia of rank,
decorations and objects of- value may not be taken from
prisoners.3 1
Article 37. Prisoners of war shall be allowed individually to
receive parcels by mail, containing foods and other articles intended to supply them with food or clothing. Packages shall be
32
delivered to the addressees and a receipt given.
Defense counsel, however, invoked the following provision of another Geneva Convention of 1929, that for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of Armies in the Field: 33
Article 16... the right of requisition recognized to belligerents
by the laws and customs of war shall be exercised only in case
29. See 9 LAw REP oRTs OF TRIALS OF WAR C m .ALS94 (1949), expressing the
opinion that the defendants in the Skorzeny case were not entitled to the immunity
extended by article 31 of the Hague Regulations since they "were not tried as spies
but were tried for a violation of the laws and usages of war."
30. July 27, 1929, 47 STAT. 2021, T.S. No. 846, 4 MALLOY, TREATiES 5224 (Trenwith
ed. 1938). For 1949 revision, see [1955] U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
31. The corresponding article 18 of the 1949 revision, cited supra note 30, contains this sentence: "Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their
regulation military equipment!' (Emphasis added.)
32. The corresponding article 72 of the 1949 revision, cited supra note 30, Is in
part different from the 1929 text.

33. July 27, 1929, 47

STAT.

2074, T.S. No. 847, 4 MALLOY,

TREATIS

5209 (Trenwith

ed. 1938). For 1949 revision, see [1955] 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362.
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of urgent necessity and after the wounded and sick have been
34
provided for.
It was claimed, in countering counts III and IV of the accusation, that
what was charged therein was a legitimate exercise of the right of requisition sanctioned by that provision, since there existed-an urgent-necessityand since wounded and sick were not affected by the particular actions.
We shall come back to this point when taking up the question of what
may have caused the war crimes tribunal to find the defendants not
guilty of any of the offenses charged against them.

IV. THE

EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN THE SKORZENY TRIAL

It is in the light of the foregoing legal background that the facts
brought out in the Skorzeny trial must be looked at to form a theory of
the possible reason or reasons for the acquittal of all the defendants
on all counts of the accusation. But before turning to an overall presentation of those facts, certain observations will be made on the nature of
the evidence that was supposed to be the basis for the court's findings.
A. Principle Determining Admissibility
The, principle determining admissibility of evidence was the one
applied in all war crimes trials conducted in Germany under the auspices
of the War Crimes Group of the American army of occupation. Under
this principle any evidence could be admitted which in the opinion of
the tribunal had "probative value to a reasonable man."3 5 With the
exception of the so-called character rule, the Anglo-American so-called
exclusionary rules were not applicable. 36 While this may have been a
surprise to the American officers convened to compose the court and to
.American military personnel acting as defense counsel,3 7 it was something
familiar to the defendants and German defense counsel, since in the

34. No exact counterpart in 1949 revision, cited supra note 33.
35. Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39 GEo. L.J. 18, 69-70,

107 (1950). In the so-called Saboteurs case, tried in this country in 1942 by a military
commission appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the same principle was prescribed in the decree appointing the commission, namely: "Such evidence shall be admitted as would, in the opinion of the President of the Commission,
have probative value to a reasonable man." 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (1942).
36. Koessler, supra note 35, at 70.
37. Not only German defense counsel, but also legally trained American officers
and U.S. War Department civilians were acting as defense counsel in war crimes
trials conducted in Germany under the auspices of the War Crimes Group of the
American occupation army.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss1/7
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civil law countries exclusionary rules of evidence of the Anglo-American
kind do not exist, the admissibility of evidence being there largely a
matter for reasonable exercise of discretion by the court. Thus hearsay
evidence is admissible there, though looked at with great distrust in
weighing its credibility. There is, of course, ample space for a reasonable
difference of opinion on whether this civil law system of absence of
strict regimentation of the admissibility of evidence or the common law
system of rigid exclusionary rules would be 'more recommendable if
the question came up de novo. The exclusionary rules are more radical
than the civil law system in attempting to prevent miscarriage of justice
that may be caused by reliance on evidence which because of its nature
has only a slight degree of probative value. They kill the evil at the root,
the admission stage, and not only at the end, the weighing of credibility
phase. They thus constitute an important benefit of a defendant in a
criminal case in this country. And they are highly appropriate where
the fact finding is entrusted to jurors who, mostly devoid of legal
training, may be inclined to take hearsay evidence at its face value.
On the other hand, by the inherent adjunct of numerous objections and
rulings thereon, the exclusionary rules are bound to delay the conduct
of a trial and to lend themselves to abuse for dilatory tactics. Moreover,
and most important, they thereby impair a coherent presentation of the
facts and sometimes present a technical obstacle to the bringing out of
facts the knowledge of which is necessary to obtain a clear and complete
factual picture. All this is avoided in the civil law system where, however,
the absence of rigid exclusionary rules does not prove dangerous because
the fact finding is mostly in the hands of learned judges who are able to
apply the necessary caution in weighing the credibility of second class
kinds of evidence. It is the writer's impression, gained from a study of
numerous war crimes trial records, that the war crimes tribunals, while
in effect applying, the civil law system in this respect, 38 were not always
successful in avoiding the pitfall inherent in the admission of evidence
that in its nature is of questionable trustworthiness, rather, in certain
cases, were to an undue degree impressed by such evidence when making
findings of fact.3 9 And he has also some doubt as to the wisdom of the
policy to dispense with the exclusionary rules just in proceedings against

38. For the almost ubiquitous prevalence of this practice in the World War II
war crimes trials, see 15 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 197-99 (1949).
39. This observation is made with particular reference to the concentration
camp cases.
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enemy defendants. It is a fact that the exclusionary rules, based on
common law tradition, are in this country considered as sacrosanct, in
so far as criminal trials are concerned, although the need for a certain
streamlining of them is recognized40 and their transplantation into the
somewhat novel field of administrative proceedings is generally held inadvisable,41 and in some jurisdictions barred by statute.42 The doing
away with them in the war crimes trials was therefore bound to create
at least the semblance of discrimination. However, in so far as the
Skorzeny case is concerned, the foregoing discussion is of merely academic interest, in view of the acquittal of all the defendants, the case
thus being one of those refuting, by their outcome, the statement by the
author of a book on an important war crimes trial" that in no war crimes
trial was there "an honest possibility of acquittal.""4 In the case of a
conviction the question would have been appropriate whether, and if so
to what extent, it was questionable because of in part untrustworthy
evidentiary foundation. But, as there was an acquittal; the simple statement will be sufficient that the described admission practice opened the
door for the introduction by both sides of documentary and testimonial
evidence of a kind not falling within any of -the recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule and which would therefore have been inadmissible in
a criminal case tried in this country, either before a civilian or before
a military court.4 5 We shall, nevertheless, before attempting to -present a
recital of the essential facts as they appear from the trial record, give a
more particular description of the admitted evidence.-

40. Seee.g., McCopmcK, EvDEN E 626-34 (1954) (proposals for change in rules
about hearsay).
41. 1 WxmoR, EVinNcE §§ 4(a),(b),(c) (3d ed. 1940); HmRT, INTEODUCoN To

LAw 606-20 (2d ed. 1950).
42. CAL.Gov'T CODE § 11513(c) provides in part, "Any relevant evidence shall be
admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to
rely in the conduct of serious affairs', regardless of the existence of any-common law
ADMNISTUArvE

or statutory rule which might make improper the admission of such evidence ovier
objection in civil actions." It also provides, however, "Hearsay evidence may 'be
used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining any direct evidence -but shall not
be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection

in civil actions."
43. Reviewed in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).

44.

Tm: CAsE or GsxzL YmswrA 242 (1949).
CounRs'MaRTA U.S. ARMY 155 (1949), containing-this statement: "Hearsay is not evidence. This means simply that a fact can not -be proved by
showing that somebody stated it was a fact... Underlying the hearsay rule is the
REL,

45. See

MANIAL FOR

principle that the testimony of witnesses, to be of value, must be taken in court so
that the witnesses may be sworn, cross-examined, confronted by the accused, and

observed by the court."
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B. Documents
The prosecution's direct case included written statements in sworn
or affidavit form obtained in the course of the pre-trial investigation
from several defendants, not including Skorzeny, and from other persons. 46 While most of the pre-trial statements of defendants made only
an insignificant contribution to the proof of the charges, were not selfincriminatory, and in part even tended to rebut the charges, the affidavit
of the defendant Kocherscheid was extremely self-damaging, 47 at least
to the greatest extent,4 8 with regard to his action in an incident which
was not specified in the charge sheet. But in its opening statement the
prosecution described it as "one of the yellowest incidents of the war,
wherein an American soldier, attempting to help what he thought was
a fellow-American out of the mud, a fellow-American soldier being in an
American jeep and dressed in an American uniform, was shot." The fact
that Kocherscheid did not take the stand could well have been considered
as an admission of the truthfulness of the self-incriminatory part of his
affidavit, especially since it was corroborated by testimonies, though
only of a hearsay nature.

46. In rebuttal of such an affidavit of a person who was not a defendant in this
case the defense introduced a later affidavit of the same affiant. The manner of
obtaining the pre-trial statements introduced by the prosecution was testified to by
the chief investigator of the Skorzeny case, identical with one of those investigators of
the Malmedy Massacre case, whose questionable methods are referred to in the
Senate document MALMDY MASSACRE INVESTIGATiON, Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). The record
does not revel, however, that similar methods were used in the investigation of the
Skorzeny case, except for the defense affidavit mentioned in the beginning of the
present note and for the testimony, on cross-examination, of a prosecution witness, an
American born German, that in the course of the pre-trial investigation he had been
placed under duress, especially by being threatened that he might be prosecuted as an
American traitor.
47. It reads in part as follows: "When it was pitch dark ... we took off....
After we had crossed the class A road which leads from Ligneuville to St. Vith, we
got stuck in a mudhole. After a short futile try to drive on, a man of my team went
to the road in order to watch. A few moments later he returned with an American
NP. According to plans our speaker conversed with him. We continued our efforts
and the NP helped pushing at first. Then we began to dig out the wheels using a
spade we carried with us. The MP had posted himself a few meters to the left of the
car and looked at us. Since our linguistic knowledge was unsatisfactory, I surmised
his suspicion. I could not follow the conversation between my speaker and the MP.
When it was clear to me that my speaker did not master this situation, I decided to
shoot this XP.... I discharged five shots with an American colt at the MP . ..
at a distance of about three meters. I did not use the noiseless machinepistol which
was given us for such situations."
48. In a part of his affidavit subsequent to the portion quoted in note 47, supra,
he in effect alleges not to have killed the NP, probably because his shots had not hit
but missed the target.
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The pre-trial affidavit of another defendant, Muentz, is interesting
because of the following statement contained therein. When in the course
of the requisitioning of American uniforms from a prisoner of war camp,
American officers, detained there, were ordered to turn in their field
jackets, quite a few of them before complying with this order tore up
their jackets so as to make them useless for the Skorzeny Brigade.
Included in the prosecution's documentary evidence was also a
copy of a telegram of Field Marshal Keitel, 49 which had been distributed
among all units of the German armed forces, and shows that the original
idea was to enlist only volunteers for the new organization. It mentions
that "the Fuehrer" has directed the formation of a special troup, in the
force of about two battalions, for particular undertakings on the Western
Front, that this troup should be composed of volunteers from all branches
of the armed forces, including the Waffen SS, and that, to be acceptable,
volunteers must in addition to a high degree of physical and intellectual
aptitude and training for man-to-man fighting have a certain command
of the English language, including the American "dialect" and military
terms.
One documentary item was introduced by the prosecution after the
defense had rested. It was an official letter of General Omar N. Bradley,
dated September 5, 1947, in which the former Commanding General of
the 12th United States Army Group stated:
To the best of my knowledge and belief no American soldier was
ever ordered or permitted to go into action against the German
Army, or any other army, while dressed as a German soldier, a
civilian, or in any manner other than that of an American
soldier, and certainly not while under my command. This applying as well to the action at Aachen and Saarlauten as to any
other action or battle engaged in by the United States Army. To
have resorted to the wearing of the enemy uniform or civilian
clothing in action would have been contrary to the usages of
war, and would not have been approved or permitted by either
the Supreme Headquarters in Europe for the Allied Forces, or
by the United States War Department.
Finally, as part of its direct case, the prosecution introduced documentary evidence that numerous members of the Skorzeny Brigade, in

49. One of those who in the Nuremberg trial against Herman Goering et al. were
sentenced to death and executed.
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American uniforms when captured, had, in most cases during the Battle
of the Bulge, in one case subsequently thereto and shortly before the
armistice in Europe, been tried by American military commissions as
spies, found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed.5 0
Turning now to the documentary evidence introduced by the defense,
it was mainly devoted to an attempt to prove that the use of enemy
uniforms as a stratagem had been indulged in also on the Allied side.
An affidavit of a German named Guenther Wisliceny claimed hearsay
knowledge of use of German uniforms by American patrols. An affidavit
of the German General Walter Warlimont 5 ' referred to similar stratagems
that allegedly had been practised by British Commandos.5 2 A sworn
statement of a Brigadier-General, Kurt Freiherr von Muehlen, mentioned
the allegation that Americans, by the ruse of being clothed in German
uniforms, had obtained control of a strategically important bridge and
thus prevented the carrying out of a German plan to destroy it prior to
the enemy's approach. Professor Dr. P. E. Schramm, a Major in the
reserve, referred in his affidavit to hearsay that the British Lieutenant
Alexander had been in German uniform when he attempted to kidnap
General Rommel, then commander of the German Africa Corps, and that
'during- the Battle of the, Bulge- German uniforms- had been seen on
Americans. An excerpt from an American book glorifying the heroic
deeds of agents of the Office of Strategic Services and in this connection
referring to the underground action in Austria of an American corporal
wearing a German officer's uniform,"3 was introduced for the same
defense purpose. Finally, part of this group of documentary evidence
introduced by the defense was a German official report on events at
the Western Front in a period ending December 21, 1944. It contained

50. The respective part of the record consists of the original trial files of one
case (December 6, 1944) wherein seven such defendants, another one (December 21,
1944) wherein three, another one (December 31, 1944) wherein three, and one (May
5, 1945) wherein one such defendant, were convicted and sentenced to death, and in
addition an affidavit of a French war correspondent on the execution, on December
23, 1944, at a place in Belgium, of three Germans who, caught in American uniforms,
had been convicted as spies and sentenced to death by an American military commission.
51. Identical with one of the defendants in Nuremberg case No. 12 (High Command Case). See APPLmAN, MnaTARY TRmUNALS AND INTEMNATIONAL C~nnEs 230
(1954).
52.
War H
purpose
53.

The writer did not find anything of this kind in the histories of World
and the monographs on the British Commandos studied by him for the
of this Article.
FORD & MACBAIN, CLOAK AND DAGGER 16-19 (1946).
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the statement that heavy losses had occurred due to the fact that
54
Americans had attacked in German uniforms.
C. Witnesses
The prosecution called in the course of its direct case numerous
witnesses, mostly Germans, and among them mostly persons who had
served in the Skorzeny Brigade. Other German witnesses of the prosecution included such nazi luminaries as the aforementioned General "Sepp"
Dietrich and Colonel Joachim Peiper who had occupied important command positions during the Battle of the Bulge,5" SS General Gottlob
Berger, who had been chief of the SS main office that was in charge
of the administration of prisoners war camps, 6 and his deputy in that
office, SS Colonel Fritz Meurer. Also three American witnesses were
called by the prosecution when it presented its direct case. Each of these
German and American witnesses made a substantial contribution to the
overall story arising from the record and summarized in the following
main part of this article. In partial anticipation thereof, a few particulars
appearing from those testimonies will be mentioned presently.
While according to one item of the prosecution's documentary
evidence, those members of the Skorzeny Brigade who joined the Combat
Group Peiper in the fighting in the vicinity of Malmedy did this in
German uniforms,5 7 an American officer who had been engaged in that
combat on the opposite side testified that some of his opponents wore
American uniforms with German parachute overalls, admitting however,
on cross-examination by defense counsel that this had had no deceptive

54. Nothing in corroboration of this self-serving statement from the German
military side, which is at variance with the letter of General Bradley quoted in pt. IV,
§ B, supra, was found by the writer in pertinent literature obtained in preparation of
this Article. And from Mr. Robert E. Merriam, author of DARK DECErER: THE FULL
AccouNT or THE BAUrIE op TH BuLGE (1947), he received a letter dated March 10,
1958, referring to CLOAK AND DAGGER, op. cit. supra note 53, and stating in effect that
there seems to be nothing in the existing literature pertaining to possible use, by
American soldiers not acting as agents of the Office of Strategic Services, of enemy
uniform for disguise.
55. Both had been defendants and were convicted in the Malmedy Massacre
case, in which judgment was rendered July 16, 1946, thus more than a year prior to
the beginning of the Skorzeny trial. However, the report of the Senate Committee,
MALLIEDY MASSACRE INVESTIGATION, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), was not rendered until
October 1949, about two years subsequent to the termination of the Skorzeny case.
56. He was, subsequent to the termination of the Skorzeny case, one of the
defendants tried and convicted in that Nuremberg trial which is usually referred to
as the Ministries case. See APPLEmAN, op. cit. supra note 51, at 222.
57. Pre-trial affidavit of Defendant Scherf.
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effect on him.58 But a German prosecution witness who had participated
in that particular engagement of members of the Skorzeny Brigade 0
definitely stated that no American uniforms were worn on that occasion,
and to the same effect was the hearsay testimony of another German
prosecution witness who had not participated in that particular action
but had belonged to the Skorzeny Brigade.60
Two American witnesses who had been prisoners of war in the same
German camp 61 testified about the fact that prisoners of war in that camp
had been ordered to turn in American uniform pieces they were wearing.62 But two German prosecution witnesses, General Berger and
Colonel Meurer, testified that according to an instruction given by
Skorzeny, American uniforms and Red Cross packages had to be procured
only from the warehouses of prisoner of war camps and booty magazines;
that the two defendants, Fitze and Muentz, who in view of the insufficiency of those sources requisitioned American jackets from the personal
possession of prisoners of war, acted in that respect contrary to the
instruction, and were therefore reported for disciplinary action. Testifying with regard to the same part of the charges, another German called
to the stand by the prosecution 8 alleged that some of those trained for
the Brigade's mission expressed doubts as to whether the requisitioning
of American uniforms and of Red Cross parcels was in accordance with
the international conventions bearing on this matter.
With regard to the shooting incident related in the defendant
Kocherscheid's aforementioned affidavit 4 there was no detailed account
by any prosecution witness and no eyewitness testimony, but merely

58. First Lieutenant William J. O'Neill. Similarly, Teofil Mory, a German
witness of the prosecution, who as a member of the Skorzeny Brigade had participated in that particular action, testified that he was in German uniform when
captured, but that some of his comrades were in American uniforms when captured
on the same occasion.
59. Albert Ernest who had been a member of the unit commanded by the
defendant Scherf and of which the defendant Hass was the "Adjutant" (corresponding
to American "Executive Officer").
60. Franz Lang, a navy man, who had at-his request been transferred to the
Skorzeny Brigade.
61. Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Herte and Master Sergeant Paul W. Hodnette.
62. To the same effect were also two items of the prosecution's documentary
evidence, pre-trial affidavits of Colonel Paul R. Goode and Sergeant Walter W. Oakes
who had been prisoners of war in the same camp with the witnesses Herte and
Hodnette.
63. Joachim Heinz who had been assigned to the warehouse of the Brigade's
training center.
64. Quoted and commented on in notes 47, 48 supra.
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general corroboration by two German prosecution witnesses who knew
about it only from hearsay. One of them, whom Kocherscheid himself
had informed about it, 65 testified that only one American NP had been
shot at on that occasion. The other one6 6 testified to having learned from
a different hearsay source that two American AP's had helped Kocherscheid's team and had been shot at by Germans wearing American uniforms.
The foregoing is not exhaustive of but merely a sampling of particular features brought out by the prosecution in the course of its direct
case. For rebuttal purposes it called two witnesses. One of them was an
American 67 who as a volunteer had participated in British Commando
raids on the French coast and who testified that no German uniforms
68
had been used in carrying out those actions. The other was a German
who had been the chief of the legal section of the German High Command and who testified that while occupying that position he had not
learned of any case of American or British troups fighting in German
uniforms. On cross-examination he mentioned that the British Lieutenant
Alexander had looked like a German, especially had been wearing
German headgear, when caught in an attempt to kidnap Rommel, and
that it had been contemplated to try him on this ground as a war criminal,
but that no such action had been taken.
We turn now to the defense witnesses. Only one of them, Skorzeny,
the only one among the defendants who took the stand,6 9 testified with
regard to the facts involved in the charges, of which he gave a rather
complete and on the whole truthful, it seems, account, not including,
however, the Kocherscheid incident. Three other witnesses were called
by the defense to support its tu-quoque plea,70 that is the allegation that
practices similar to those charged by the prosecution had occurred on
65. Herbert Petter who had belonged to a reconnaissance team of the Brigade.
66. Otto Sternhuber, a German and member of the Skorzeny Brigade who, however, was American born and had spent his early youth in this country from which
his parents only thereupon returned to Germany.
67. First Lieutenant Elmer Moody.
68. Major General Rudolf Lehmann, one of those who were convicted in the
Nuremberg trial generally referred to as the High Command Case. See APPLEwrx,
MunARy TRmuxAms AN INTERNATIONAL Craims 230 (1954).
69. On behalf of the other defendants counsel declared their readiness to testify
should the tribunal desire it, of which offer no use was made, however, the
record not disclosing any reason for this failure.

70. That term, according to AsmcIA CoLuGE DIcTIONARY 1306 (1952) denotes
cca retort accusing of a similar crime an opponent who has brought charges against
one."
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the Allied side. A German Brigadier General 71 gave an affirmative
answer to the question whether in his capacity as Division Commander
in the Battle of the Bulge he had received reports on Americans wearing
German uniforms in attacking Germans. He was not asked for and did
not add any specification. Similarly vague was the testimony of another
German defense witness, 72 who in the capacity of first lieutenant had
participated in the Battle of the Bulge and who alleged to have received
during that campaign a report on the use of German uniforms by enemy
troups. Not in the nature of hearsay, like the two foregoing testimonies,
but based on directly acquired knowledge were the statements made
by a British officer who appeared as a defense witness.7 3 But his
testimony was hardly related to the point actually involved, namely the
question of use of German uniforms in the course of Allied military
actions. He mentioned that he had been in civilian clothes, and not in
foreign uniform, when parachuted into France to cooperate with the
underground group there, but that he had planned to liberate a French
officer (belonging to that underground and caught and imprisoned by
the Gestapo) by- the following ruse. Certain members of the British
Intelligence Service, who along with him as their superior had been
parachuted into France and who had a perfect command of the German
language, were to be put in German uniforms and to be provided with a
fake German order pursuant to which they would be authorized to take
that prisoner from the jail. The plan'had not been carried out, however,
since prior to its execution knowledge of it had leaked out and reached
the Gestapo. He also alleged in a general way that members of the British
Secret Service operating in France had for camouflage purposes used
German uniforms, identity papers, insignia, and vehicles, that some of
those German identity papers had been taken in an irregular manner
from the German Headquarters in France, and that the use of German
uniforms had been considered in a planned but never executed undertaking to kidnap Admiral Doenitz.Defense counsel requested that depositions be taken of the British
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten and of the former Chief of the American Office of Strategic Services, William Donovan, on the use, by British
71. Hugo Kraas, Brigadier General in the Waffen SS, in the Battle of the Bulge
in command of the 12th SS Armored Division.
72. Wolfgang Loose.
73. Wing Commander F.F.E. Yeo-Thomas of the Intelligence Service of the

RA.F.
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as well as American troups, especially British Commandos, during combat
action and prior thereto, of German uniforms; on the alleged fact that
Lieutenant Alexander, a nephew of the British Field Marshal Alexander,
was in German uniform when he attempted to kidnap Rommel; and on
related other facts alleged by the defense. The record does not show any
action taken by the tribunal on this motion which, as the tu quoque plea
as a whole, was legally based by defense counsel on a precedent allegedly
created by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in announcing its reasons" for the partial acquittal of Admiral
Doenitz.7 4 It may finally be mentioned that according to Skorzeny's
testimony, which in this respect may have been a self-serving theory
rather than based on recollection, reports on Americans who had successfully operated in German uniforms inspired Hitler to incorporate a
similar feature in the masterplan for the Ardennes offensive.
V.

FACTUAL RouNDuP

Omitting most of those factual features that have been incidentally
covered before, especially the episode related in the affidavit of the
defendant Kocherscheid, 75 this is a brief summary of the story of organization and action of the Skorzeny Brigade as it appears from the lengthy
trial record.
A. Organization of the Brigade
Legend and history contain several accounts of ruses employed in
fighting an enemy, including as the most colorful and best known one
the story of the Trojan Horse. Whether inspired by any of those precedents, or by reports on alleged Allied practices, or independently flowing
from that "Nordische List" (Nordic shrewdness) of which the nazis were
proud, Hitler's master plan for the Ardennes offensive included the use
of a stratagem whose original code name was "Rabenhuegel" (Ravens'
Hill) and whose final code name was "Greif" (Griffin). The idea was to
create a special task force, called the "150th Panzer Brigade" when

74. "In view of all of the facts proved and in particular of an order of the
British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to which all vessels should
be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answers to interrogatories by Admiral
Nirnitz stating that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific
Ocean by the United States from the first day that Nation entered the war, the
sentence of Doenitz is not assessed on the ground of his breach of the international
law of submarine warfare." 1 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRI INALs BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TmIuNAL, NUREMBERG

313

(1947).

75. Quoted and commented on in notes 47, 48 supra.
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activated, members of -which, by being disguised as and posing as Americans, should infiltrate enemy lines and pass behind them. That special
unit should first move with the advance elements of the army undertaking the offensive, but as soon as possible sever from and operate
independently from the main body of the attacking forces. The principal
task to be performed by it was to reach with lightning speed certain
strategically most important bridges crossing the river Maas in Belgium
and maintaining control of them until the German breakthrough should
have reached that point. Other parts of it should carry out intelligence
and sabotage activities and confuse and discourage the enemy by the
spreading of fake news. All this was revealed to Skorzeny when towards
the end of October 1944 he was called to Hitler's headquarters and by
the "Fuehrer" in person entrusted with the mission to form and command
that special unit. He was, however, at his request and in view of other
important responsibilities then resting on him, allowed by Hitler to
deputize Lt. Colonel Hardick" as the commander of the unit in its
organization and training stage and to take over only immediately before
the beginning of the offensive. The recruiting and training center of the
Brigade, located at a place called Grafenwoehr, was thus in charge of
Hardick. But Skorzeny participated in the determination of certain
policies, especially of the methods whereby American uniforms and other
material should be procured for the Brigade. And he once appeared at
the training center and delivered there a speech in the course of which
he emphasized the importance of the Brigade's mission as well as the
great risk involved in participating in the carrying out of it and expressly
declared that anybody who on second thought would like to be assigned
to other duties should say so and would see his desire fulfilled without
being considered a coward. 71 In addition to this talk by Skorzeny himself,
the extraordinary nature of the Brigade's mission was impressed on the
minds of those trained for it by the fact that they were sworn to secrecy
regarding that mission and related facts. To enable them to avoid revealing the secret under duress when falling" into enemy hands, they were
supplied with suicide pills. The original plan was that enlistment for or
transfer to the Brigade should be on a voluntary basis. 78 But since the
number of qualified volunteers was insufficient, that part of the initial

76. Not among the defendants since he had died prior to the trial.
77. The evidence is conflicting on whether, and if so, to what extent, use was
made of this offer.
78. See the description of Keitel's circular order in pt. IV, § B, supra.
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idea had to be abandoned even to the extent that whole parts of certain
military units were transferred to the Brigade. For similar reasons
another feature of the original scheme had to be dropped, namely, the
requirement of a good command of the English language including
American slang.79 It was attempted to be made up for by intensive
linguistic training as a result of which, however, only a part of those
who had had no prior knowledge of the English language or had h ad
such knowledge but had not been familiar with the American linguistic
peculiarites, acquired some, but only a poor, knowledge of English and
of its American variety, whereas the remainder, including most high
ranking officers, did not get even so far prior to the Brigade's entering
into operation. It is related to this fact that ordinarily only one member
of a Commando team of the Brigade was to be the "speaker." 80 To enable
them to successfully impersonate American soldiers, those trained for
that deceptive practice were shown American films in which American
soldiers appeared as principal characters. They were given instruction
on habitual attitudes of American GI's, including, for instance, their
manner of smoking cigarettes. The visiting of prisoner of war camps was
arranged to give the trainees an opportunity of gaining a vivid impression
of how American soldiers would speak and behave. Included in the training program was also a course on American unit designations and
insignia, to prevent any member of the Brigade speaking on behalf of
his team from disclosing his enemy character by showing lack of familiarity with those designations and insignia.
According to directions issued by the top officials in charge of this
matter, including Skorzeny, the material to be used by the Brigade for
camouflage purposes was to be procured only from booty and prisoner
of war camp magazines, 8 ' and the two defendants, Fitze and Muentz,
who requisitioned certain uniform pieces from the personal possession
of American prisoners of war acted against this instruction; or so it
appears from unrebutted defense evidence mentioned before.8 2 According to one prosecution witness, 3 the defendant Captain von Behr was

79. Ibid.
80. See the portion of Kocherscheid's affidavit quoted in note 47 supra.
81. There was evidence to the effect that at that time the camp magazines had
some reserve stock of American uniforms since the Red Cross furnished two sets
of uniforms for each prisoner of war.
82. See pt. IV, § C, supra.
83. Franz Lang.
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in charge of that part of the processing at Grafenwoehr whereby the
trainees were sorted into several classes on the basis of their degree of
knowledge of English. There was apparently no further evidence linking
defendants, other than Skorzeny himself, with any particular phase of
the preparatory activities.8 4
B. The Brigade in Action
Shortly before the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, which, as
mentioned before, started on December 16, 1944, the Brigade, then already under the direct command of Skorzeny himself, assembled in a
forest close to the German-Belgian border. It consisted of four main
units: a commando company in charge of a Lieutenant Stielau and three
combat groups respectively in charge of a Lt. Colonel Wulff, the aformentioned Lt. Colonel Hardick and the defendant, Captain Scherf. Three
types of teams were formed for the carrying out of the planned special
activities: reconnaissance, sabotage and broadcasting teams. Each team
normally consisted of four men: a leader, a speaker, a driver and a
specialist in the kind of activity the particular team was supposed to
engage in. American weapons, ammunition, and jeeps were made available to these teams. Each member of a team was given an American name
and rank and a corresponding American identity paper. Also, American
pay data sheets, PX cards, trip tickets, pictures of American soldiers
and women, and American letters were distributed, as well as American
Red Cross packages containing soap, chocolate, canned meat and cigarettes. The food rations consisted of about two-thirds German and about
one third American rations, the American rations to be used only on
infiltration though enemy lines. American money too was made available
to the teams.
Only after having reached the aforementioned assembly center were
the men of the Brigade allowed to put on American uniforms. However,
as long as they were not about to reach enemy lines they had to cover up
the American uniforms by wearing over them German parachute combination suits going down over the knees and therefore in military slang
called "Knochensackl" (bones bag). Similarly, although they carried with
them American helmets, they had to wear German field caps until the

84. In part of its opening statement the prosecution referred -to the fact that
each of the defendants had had officer's rank and that each of them had taken part
in organizing the Brigade.
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time when they would drop the German combination suits and be ready
to pose as Americans. To avoid being treated as enemies by German
troups, they were supposed to use certain signaling acts for the disclosure
of their true national character. Although noiseless weapons were given
to them, they -were ordered to avoid direct contact with enemy troups
as much as possible.
As was the case with respect to the entire Ardennes offensive, so also
the commitment of the 150th Panzer Brigade proved to be a failure. Its
main purpose, to reach and occupy the Maas bridges, had to be abandoned
when the lightning advance of the Sixth Panzer Army was stopped by
ever stronger Allied counter operations. Only a few of the commando
teams were successful in crossing or infiltrating enemy lines without
being caught and treated as spies. Except for the Kocherscheid incident,
there is not the least indication that a single one of these independently
operating commando teams was ever engaged in a fight with enemy
troups. But the evidence is conflicting, as has been shown before, on
whether or not American uniforms were used by that substantial part
of the main body of the Brigade which was engaged (around December
20, 1944) in combat action in closed formation around Malmedy. It
appears highly unlikely that in this kind of action any purpose could
have been achieved by American disguises. Hence, Skorzeny's testimony
that according to definite orders they had to carry out that action in
German uniforms would seem to be highly credible despite its self-serving
effect. A possible explanation of the conflict in the evidence may be that
some of the men had lost the German combination suits they were
supposed to wear over their American uniforms and were thus wearing
only the latter, without, however, intending or producing the effect of
concealment of their true national character. Those men of the Brigade
who were still alive when the German retreat was begun were brought
back to Grafenwoehr and there disbanded. When some of his former
subordinates had been arrested to be prosecuted as war criminals,
Skorzeny who at that time was in Salzburg, Austria, surrendered to
assist them in their defense, or so he testified. He himself had never worn
American uniform. His code name had been "Solar."
VI. THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

AND

A SPECULATIVE

EXPLANATION OF IT

The Skorzeny trial, unique because of the subject matter involved
in the charges and the historical significance inherent in it ended with
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an anticlimax. As mentioned before, the tribunal found Skorzeny and
his codefendants not guilty of any of the accusations raised against them,
without announcing the reasons for this judgment. The following discussion is therefore merely the writer's speculation about the possible
grounds of acquittal-in other words an after-the-fact attempt of rationalization. It will neglect the always existing possibility that prosecution
counsel may not have been a match for defense counsel, and will merely
look for reasons inherent in the facts as presented in the trial and in
the pertinent law. The acquittal of the defendant Kocherscheid must be
considered separately from that of the other defendants since with regard
to the first count of the accusation the case against him was singled out
by his self-incriminatory pre-trial affidavit.8 5
A. Acquittal Theories in Kocherscheid's Case
Kocherscheid did not testify. Only hearsay testimony corroborated
his written story. Therefore, and since an admission, like any piece of
evidence, is subject to the court's weighing of its credibility, the possibility
cannot be excluded that the facts stated in his affidavit were considered
as not established by it beyond any reasonable doubt.8 0 Moreover even
on the face of that affidavit there was nothing showing that the Alp shot
at was killed br wounded.8 7 Hence, despite the obviously most perfidious
manner of Kocherscheid's action as stated by him, the aforementioned
article 23 (b) of the Hague Regulations prohibiting a treacherous "killing
or wounding" of individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army was
not applicable, at least not according to its wording. And even if all this
were disregarded, Kocherscheid may have been acquitted on the basis
of 'either of the following two legal theories. The court may have been
persuaded by the argument of defense counsel that he had acted in selfdefense, 8 although it would seem that this plea was hardly sound in the
85. See the portion of that affidavit quoted and commented on in notes 47, 48

supra.

86. "...
it would appear that the accused Kocherscheid's acquittal was based
on lack of sufficient evidence, as he did not give evidence at the trial and the
Prosecutions case rested entirely on his pre-trial affidavit." 9 LAW REPORTS Or TnXALS
or WAR CRmwArS 94 (1949).

87.

"In... the case of the accused Kocherscheid who in an affidavit admitted

that he fired on an American military police sergeant when dressed in American

uniform, the accused stated in his affidavit that he fired several shots at the sergeant,
but there was no evidence to show that he killed or even wounded him as was
alleged in the charge." Id. at 93.
88. ".... even if Kocherscheid had shot at the MP, this act does not amount to
a war crime. He was on an espionage mission in No Man's Land when he met the
MEP. He believed on reasonable grounds that he and his comrades were discovered.
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given situation. Finally, the court may have adopted another proposition
of defense counsel, submitted on behalf of all defendants, namely that
what they were accused of amounted in substance to espionage and that
therefore, and since they had not been caught in flagranti but had been
subject to prosecution after they had joined the forces to which they
belonged, they were entitled to the immunity extended by the aforementioned article 31 of the Hague Regulations. In the course of commenting
on the judgment, it has been suggested that that immunity is applicable
only with regard to the act of espionage itself, but not to a concurrently
committed offense, especially a violation of the prohibition by article
89
23 (f) of the Hague Regulations of improper use of enemy uniforms.
But the relation between articles 31 and 23 (f) is an unsettled matter and
the court may have given the accused the benefit of the doubt by liberally
construing article 31 in this respect.
B. Acquittal of Other Defendants Under Charge I
There was no proof that any of the defendants other than Kocherscheid had been engaged in combat action while wearing American
uniforms. The evidence, as mentioned before, was conflicting on whether
other members of the Brigade had deceptively used American uniforms
in the course of that campaign, and the court may have reached a
negative determination in this respect. But irrespective of any such
result of its weighing of the conflicting evidence, it could have reached
the conclusion that the masterplan behind the formation and use of the
Brigade did not contemplate combat action in American uniforms, that
any use of American uniforms during the campaign around Malmedy was
contrary to that masterplan and to the instructions issued pursuant to it,
and that therefore not even Skorzeny and certainly not the other accused
officers could be made responsible therefor in the absence of proof that
they themselves had participated therein or had directly or indirectly
caused it. The foregoing was sufficient for an acquittal under charge I if,
but only if, the court, in construing article 23 (f) of the Hague Regulations
adopted the view entertained by our Department of the Army, that is,

In circumstances as these, where his own life and that of his comrades was at stake,
he would have had no other choice but to shoot ... in the agony of the moment he
fired.... It was pitch dark...

."

Part of argument of defense counsel, as rendered

in official trial transcript.
89. See comment to this effect in 9 LAw

94 (1949).
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that that article does not prohibit deceptive use of enemy uniforms under
all circumstances, but merely deceptive use in combat action.
However, even if the court went further than that, more specifically
believed that the prohibition in said article 23(f) covered also use of
enemy uniforms as a stratagem for infiltrating or crossing enemy lines,
it could nevertheless have acquitted the defendants from the accusation
in count I for any or both of the following two reasons. It could have
given them the benefit of the immunity under article 31 of the Hague
Regulations, which matter has been discussed before with specific relation to the defendant Kocherscheid, or it might, in deviation from the
practice generally followed in the World War 11 war crimes trials,90
have believed that the defendants, all of whom were military men, could
not be held responsible for carrying out superior orders in organizing
or participating in a method of warfare any unlawfulness of which may
not have been patent to them in view of the uncertainties befuddling the
pertinent part of the international law. In this connection it may be
mentioned that especially in the case of defendants carrying out orders
of their military superiors, the discounting of the plea of superior order
has met with dissent from distinguished sides 1 and is contrary to the
position taken until November 15, 1944 by the United States Basic Field
Manual, Rules of Land Warfare.92
C. Acquittal of All Defendants Under Charges III and IV
By charges I and IV the defendants were in effect accused of
violations of articles 6 and 37 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention
of 1929, both of which have been quoted before. In a comment on their
acquittal from these accusations it has been suggested as a possibility
that "having acquitted the accused of the main charge the Court applied

90. See Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39 GEo. L.J. 18, 83-93
(1950).

91. See, for instance, Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in Inter-

national Law With ParticularRegard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CALIF.
L. REv. 530, 556 (1943) stating, "As to the admissibility of the plea of superior command, the different positive legal orders as well as the opinions of the jurists differ.
From a military point of view, the plea must certainly be admitted. Discipline is
possible only on the basis of unconditional obedience of the subordinate to the
superior, and the obedience of the subordinate has its necessary complement in the
exclusive responsibility. of the superior." The eminent author raises this question,
"But is it really possible to assume that every soldier knows what international law

forbids?" Id. at .58.
92. WAR DEP'T BAsic Firm MAnuA, FM 27-10, art. 347 (1940), quoted in Koessler,
supra note 90, at 83.
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the maxim de minimus non curat 1ex,93 also acquitting the accused of
what were lesser violations of the Geneva Convention."'9 4 It is not likely,
however, even if the court looked at those relatively minor and in a way
merely secondary charges in a "cavalier" fashion, that that consideration
ad hominem was the only basis of its decision to acquit. A better guess
would seem to be that the court leaned backward in favor of the accused
only in that it adopted the theory of legitimate exercise of a belligerent's
power of requisition, advanced by defense counsel, as mentioned before.
It may in this connection have reached the conclusion that such power
of requisition had overriding effect as against the specific provisions in
articles 6 and 37 of the Geneva Convention. Defense counsel also claimed
that said article 6 was not applicable on the ground that it protected only
private property of prisoners of war 95 which the uniforms in question
were not, counsel alleged. It is hardly believable that the court was
impressed with this argument which, moreover, even if it would have
been sound, could have justified only an acquittal under charge In, but
not under charge IV. Finally, at least with regard to charge In the
court hardly based its acquittal on the fact of obeyance, by the acc of superior military orders, since it acquitted also the defendants Fitze
and Muentz who, according to evidence mentioned before, had acted
contrary to instruction in requisitioning American jackets from the personal possession of prisoners of war.

:

VII. CONCLUSION

The Skorzeny case highlights the need for a clarification of the international law on the use of enemy uniforms as a stratagem by an international convention substituting for the vague phrase "improper use"
contained in article 23(f) of the Hague Regulations a definite and clear
statement on the kind of use that is intended to be prohibited. If this
Article, mainly written in a scholarly vein, will inspire the International
Law Committee of the United Nations to action toward bringing about
such a convention, it will have achieved a practical purpose too.

93. Author's note: The actual text of that originally Roman law maxim is: De
minrnus non curat praetor. See BALLmn=, LAw DICIONARY 356 (2d ed. 1948).
94.

9 LAW REPoRTs oF TmALs OF WAR CRIMMnALS 94 (1949).

95. By the words added to the contents of article 6 of the 1929 Convention in
the corresponding article 18 of the 1949 revision, the possibility of such a construction
has been precluded for the future. See the portion of article 18 quoted supra note 31.
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